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ABSTRACT
Social media platforms are motivated by profit, corporate
image, long-term viability, good citizenship, and a desire for
friendly legal environments. These managerial interests stand in
contrast to the gubernatorial interests of the state, which include
the promotion of free speech, the development of e-commerce,
various counter terrorism initiatives, and the discouragement of
hate speech. Inasmuch as managerial and gubernatorial interests
overlap, a self-regulation model of platform governance should
prevail. Inasmuch as they diverge, regulation is desirable when
its benefits exceed its costs. An assessment of the benefits and
costs of social media regulation should account for how social
facts, norms, and falsehoods proliferate. This Article sketches a
basic economic model. What emerges from the analysis is that the
quality of discourse cannot be controlled through suppression of
content, or even disclosure of source. A better approach is to
modify, in a manner conducive to discursive excellence, the
structure of the forum. Optimal platform architecture should aim
to reduce the systemic externalities generated by the social
interactions that they enable, including the social costs of
unlawful interference in elections and the proliferation of hate
speech. Simultaneously, a systemic approach to social media
regulation implies fewer controls on user behavior and content
creation, and attendant First Amendment complications. Several
examples are explored, including algorithmic newsfeeds, online
advertising, and invited campus speakers.

I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, during the ongoing wave of sexual assault claims
involving celebrities, newscasters, politicians, and high-profile
Hollywood employers, NPR’s All Things Considered ran a segment
entitled, “Women Are Speaking Up About Abuse, But Why Now?”1 Why
now is a good question. Sexual harassment has only been recognized as an
†
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All Things Considered: Women Are Speaking Up About Abuse, but Why Now?
NAT’L. PUB. RADIO (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/10/27/
560231232/women-are-speaking-up-about-harassment-and-abuse-but-why-now.
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actionable form of discrimination just recently; socio-cultural advances in
gender equality are relatively new phenomena. 2 If anything, prior levels of
abuse were at least as high as they are today—if not higher. So what
explains the recent spike in claims? During the segment, Anita Hill
conjectured that, “[since passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991], we have
been raising children—daughters in particular—with the understanding
that sexual harassment is illegal, shouldn’t be tolerated, and that it’s
wrong.”3 In other words, law drives morality and norms, and it has finally
led to concrete action twenty-five years later. Professor Hill is right to
point out that lawmakers can shape social norms, which can lead to waves
of litigation a generation delayed.4 Greater numbers of women are in
college, working, and earning higher wages, and all of this too, has played
a role. But is social media particularly adept at creating tipping points, and
if so, how exactly does social media accelerate change?
Legal scholars have explained how expressive laws, such as the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, check bad behaviors that are difficult or costly
to detect.5 New laws that express social values make it easier for victims
to speak out against social wrongs, lowering overall enforcement costs;
they raise public awareness of social problems, increasing the number of
people who sanction a wrongdoer; and shine spotlights on particular
issues, increasing the probability that public enforcement resources will be
allocated in the first place. And at times, new laws actually define what is
morally right and wrong a priori. Lawmakers function as “norm
entrepreneurs” who proclaim and calibrate social values, intuitions, and
morality.6 Normative claims, embodied in new laws, can generate “norm
cascades” and “norm bandwagons,” which quickly lead to new forms of
social behavior.7 Cass Sunstein, Richard McAdams, Bob Cooter, and
others have written extensively on how these patterns unfold and what they
mean for law.8
2

See CATHERINE MACKINNON, WOMEN’S LIVES, MEN’S LAWS 34–43 (2007)
(documenting the recognition of sexual harassment and assault as legal claims of
sexual discrimination).
3
NAT’L. PUB. RADIO, supra note 1.
4
See infra § IV.B.
5
A good example is Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995).
6
See id. at 1019 (providing examples).
7
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
903, 912 (1996) (explaining that rapid shifts in new norms help explain the
attack on apartheid in South Africa, the fall of Communism, the election of
Ronald Reagan, and the rise of the feminist movement).
8
See, e.g., id.; Cass R. Sunstein, Unleashed, Aug. 22, 2017,
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This Article aims to add to that body of work in several ways.
First, it incorporates the role of social media into the analysis of norm
evolution and explains its bearing on law. While the analysis of analog
social networks is as old as society itself,9 their digital counterparts
generally accelerate, and in some cases make possible, the cascade and
bandwagon effects described by Sunstein and others. To support this
claim, this Article develops a basic economic model that describes the
creation and proliferation of social facts, norms, and falsehoods, general
enough to account for citizens, lawmakers, and social media platforms
acting as norm entrepreneurs. By working through the details, this Article
provides a clear rationale for systemic social media platform regulation.
Several important policies are taken up, including how governments
should regulate algorithmic news feeds and online advertising, and how
universities should regulate the promotion of controversial speakers
organized by students.
In brief, factual and normative evolution begins with a person or
lawmaker who claims that some fact is true, or that a given behavior is
morally wrong. Because social media platforms control the flow of content
manufactured by people and lawmakers, platforms function as norm
entrepreneurs as well, which, at least from a functional standpoint, is at
odds with § 230 of the Communications Decency Act.10 A key component
of this Article, therefore, is to explore the communicative role of platforms
by clarifying how claim proliferation depends on their architecture. What
emerges from the analysis is that regulation, when warranted, should focus
on platform architecture and not platform speech. This conclusion is
consistent with § 230 inasmuch as platform liability would be based upon
violations of systemic rules rather than responsibility for speech.
Regardless of who is responsible for the origination of a factual or
normative claim, claims can spread leading to new patterns of behavior
and social enforcement. For instance, lawmakers recognized sexual
harassment as a social wrong when they passed the Civil Rights Act of
1991. Validity claims are also made by friends, law professors, media
executives, foreign agents purchasing a Facebook ad—essentially anyone
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3025749; RICHARD A. MCADAMS, THE
EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW: THEORIES AND LIMITS 42 (2015) (describing the
informative and focalizing effects of norms and the relevance to law of these
effects).
9
Aristotle’s Politics suffices for documenting the analysis and recognized
importance of social networks in the ancient world. See generally ARISTOTLE,
POLITICS (R.F. Stalley ed. Ernest Barker trans. Oxford Univ. Press Release ed.
2009) (c. 350 B.C.E.).
10
See infra § IV.C.

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

396

who can be heard. When claims stick, they are replicated over social
networks and unleash norm cascades.
The principal difference between analog and digital social
networks is that the latter consist of broad and horizontal membership
across narrow attitudes and beliefs. While the bonds between social media
platform members are often thin, platform architecture supports greater
volume and breadth when compared to traditional social networks. Norm
entrepreneurs who effectively tap platform networks and make their
claims “go viral,” exercise marginal de facto rulemaking, fact-making, and
potentially outsized influence in socio-legal activities such as national
elections.11 It is true that rumors, and remedies for injurious rumors, are as
old as the wellsprings of common law,12 but platforms can accelerate, and
in some instances make possible, the proliferation of defamatory and other
types of facts. Moreover, facts have lifecycles. They proliferate when the
social network that they harness is systemically strong and resilient to
counter-facts, falsehoods, and other forms of declaratory corruption.
The proliferation of a fact or norm, or a particular version of
either, is valuable to the extent that it changes behavior, and this value can
accrue to both private entities and the state alike. Social media platforms
such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter pursue managerial interests,
which include profit, corporate image, long-term viability, good
citizenship, and friendly regulatory environments. These stand in contrast
to gubernatorial interests, which are pursued by governments, and include
the promotion of free speech, the development of e-commerce, counter
terrorism initiatives, and the discouragement of hate speech.13 Inasmuch
11

In some cases, non-digital social networks can be large, narrow, and dense.
Consider that Italy’s top three television broadcasters, controlled by Silvio
Berlusconi, were able to reach nearly the entire electorate with a narrow
message that was consistently replicated. See Rachel Sanderson, Berlusconi
Study Sheds Light on Politics and Profits, FIN. TIMES, (January 4, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/eb86eb6c-d284-11e6-9341-7393bb2e1b51
(documenting Berlusconi’s control of Mediaset and its use to continually
message a national audience during his campaigns for Prime Minister). The
point is that social media platforms generally exhibit these structural features.
12
See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 436-46 (4th
ed. 2002) (noting that defamation torts were subject to the jurisdiction of
English ecclesiastical courts prior to the 17th century and then transferred to
common law courts).
13
To be sure, platforms engage in private governance when they choose to
suppress or permit speech. See Jack Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic
Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51
UC DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1153 (2018) (noting that a practical ability to engage in
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as managerial interests and gubernatorial interests overlap, self-regulation
maximizes social welfare so long as the interests themselves are
efficient.14 Inasmuch as they diverge, regulation can be socially useful if
its benefits exceed its costs. Some of the features of current proposals, such
as the one advanced by Senators Klobuchar, Warner, and McCain15
(KWM) intuitively track this approach. One of the aims of this Article is
to provide some theoretical underpinnings for the KWM proposal, and
similar ones, grounded in microeconomics and social psychology.
Assertions of factual or moral validity, when systemically spread
throughout social media, can eventually lead to unconscious compliance
and instinctual self-regulation. While this type of evolutionary path takes
a substantial period of time to complete, construction of deep policies and
normative legacies may be the only path available to lawmakers in
polarized political environments; or when enforcement costs of legal rules
are so excessive, lawmakers may have no options for generating
compliance other than nurturing moral instinct.16 These longer-term
pathways toward deep policy and unconscious compliance can help
explain attitudes toward immigration, climate change, and religious
expression in contexts such as the creation of wedding cakes for
celebrating same-sex marriages.17 It should be obvious that the
construction of deep policy is not the only way to shape social attitudes or
speech acts is subject to the private decisions of platform owners, which
amounts to private governance). For clarity, this Article treats platform
governance, or private content moderation, as a means by which platforms
pursue their managerial interests. For instance, a platform may suppress hate
speech in order to attract and keep users or avoid regulatory interference. When
doing so, this Article considers that platform as pursuing its managerial
interests.
14
Recent scholarship suggests that policymakers should recognize the intricate
content moderation systems already in place and concludes that law should take
self-regulation efforts into account when considering policy. See Kate Klonick,
The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online
Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1666 (2018) (“[A]ny proposed regulation . . . .
should work with an understanding of the intricate self-regulatory structure
already in place . . .”); Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content Moderation,
106 GEORGETOWN L. J. *11 (2018) (“Whether we decide to regulate platform
censorship or leave it to the market, the decision should be considered”).
15
The Honest Ads Act, § 1989, 115th Cong. (2017).
16
Cf. FRANK FAGAN, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT: TEMPORARY
VERSUS PERMANENT LEGISLATION 105 (2013) (providing empirical support for
the notion that the difficulty of passing laws in some domains is more difficult
than others).
17
See infra § III.B.3.
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obtain desired legal outcomes. In some instances, however, construction
of deep policy is possible and defensible within a welfarist, rational-choice
framework. Exploring and developing this approach has important
implications for the regulation of social media. To the extent that longterm managerial interests consist of the development, moderation, and
shaping of public opinion over time, the government has a weaker basis
for platform regulation, at least if that basis is grounded in First
Amendment doctrine.18 By contrast, when the benefits of speech
suppression are certain and immediate, the basis for platform regulation is
stronger, though direct confrontation with First Amendment principles can
be avoided through a systemic regulatory approach.
Social norms, of course, have historically been the domain of
sociologists, who have described compliance behavior in contrast to
consequentialist conceptions of rules as prices.19 For them, rules can
operate in gray areas as integral parts of social processes that prompt selfregulation either through stabilizing existing patterns of rule-based
behavior, or through transforming widespread ideas of what is the
appropriate mode of interaction.20 Surprisingly, a number of contemporary
economists view compliance as a result of some mix between regulatory
deterrence on the one hand, and relational obligation, socialization,
reputation, legitimacy, and other phenomena stemming from social
interaction on the other.21 Even within law and economics, whose
consequentialist tradition naturally embraces “expected punishment”
explanations of compliance, there has arisen a large project aimed at
understanding the interaction between social norms and the law.22

18

Infra § IV.A.
See, e.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD 2 (8th ed.
1938) (contrasting obedience with the law to the coercive power of moral
maxims and “the public conscience [which] exercises a check on every act
which offends it by means of the surveillance it exercises over the conduct of
citizens”).
20
See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOL. 2 144 (1990)
(theorizing that modern compliance regimes achieve success by transforming
ideas of appropriateness).
21
See Jon G. Sutinen & K. Kuperan, A Socio-Economic Theory of Regulatory
Compliance, 26 INT’L J. SOCIO-ECON. 174, 175 (1999) (presenting a model of
compliance behavior where rational agents are motivated extrinsically and
intrinsically); GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 162 (1998)
(developing a model of economic behavior where agents derive utility from
social interactions).
22
See the essays collected in SOCIAL NORMS, NON-LEGAL SANCTIONS, AND THE
LAW (Eric A. Posner ed. 2007). See also the Journal of Legal Studies
19
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Nonetheless, leading theory in law and economics can sometimes
lack clarity and full elaboration. It often provides a muddled pricetheoretic explanation for adherence to social norms: people derive
consequential utility from acting virtuously, even when their virtuous
actions are so obviously averse to their interests along other dimensions.23
For example, a generosity norm confers utility on practitioners of selfsacrifice and altruism, or a norm of environmental stewardship confers
“psychic” utility even though stewardship may be monetarily costly and
offer few individual rewards in both the short and long run. Nearly always,
foundational norms like generosity, and others that generate psychic
utility, are described as preexisting or rooted in evolutionary biology.24
That law and economics scholars have had little to say about how
foundational norms can be created by instrumentally driven agents may be
due to an intuition that guiding unconscious social norms toward
normative ends with deep policy can be easily short-circuited with
conscious rules; or perhaps it is due to the idea that welfarist guidance of
instinctual behavior may otherwise have little payoff in terms of social
value because of time and discount rates.25

symposium, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economics Analysis of Law,
27 J. LEG. STUD. 537–823. An important early contribution that describes the
ability of law itself to create and modify social norms is Robert Cooter,
Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998). See also Robert
Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens?, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577 (2000). For
a recent restatement and expansion of the theory and its limits, see generally
MCADAMS, supra note 8.
23
This approach has invited numerous critiques and outright dismissal. See, e.g.,
Elizabeth Anderson, Beyond Homo Economicus: New Developments in
Theories of Social Norms, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 170, 193 (2000) (arguing that a
desire for identification with a group can explain the motive to comply with a
norm).
24
One strategic explanation for the existence of other-regarding behaviors that
run contrary to self-interest is that they function as impulse-control devices and
signal commitment to shared long-term goals with potential partners. Thus,
moral emotions and feelings are instrumental towards achieving particular ends.
See ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF
THE EMOTIONS 211 (1988). On how evolutionary biology has shaped norms, see
PAUL BLOOM, AGAINST EMPATHY 170 (2017) (noting that “[w]e are naturally
kind because our ancestors who were kind to others outlived and outreproduced
those who [were not],” and that “[this] doesn’t mean that when people help
others they are thinking about survival and reproduction”).
25
Note that this thinking closely tracks First Amendment doctrine and its apathy
toward suppressing speech on the basis of non-immediate effects. See infra §
IV.A.
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Even if either of those intuitions are true, an instrumental
explanation for the origin of unconscious normative behavior can bring
coherence to consequentialist theories of social norms and can present
opportunities for deep social welfare maximization. Rather than stripping
social norms (and their attendant morality) of their independence and
reducing them to a master concept of utility, providing an instrumental
account actually has the opposite effect here. Deeper understanding of the
pathways toward unconscious behavior, cast in rational-choice terms,
frees up conceptual space for the construction of deep policies that elicit
unconscious compliance while respecting self-interest precisely because
the interests are constructed with citizen input.26 Moreover, a deeper
understanding of the micro-foundations of social contagion is fundamental
for addressing the systemic risk generated by social media.
The key is to develop a thorough understanding of how platforms
shape social facts and norms. Platforms obviously represent important
pathways into conscious opinion formation, but existing proposals for
intervention (or self-regulation) can benefit from explicitly
acknowledging the deeper, unconscious attitudes and behaviors in play.
By unpacking how platforms systemically generate attitudes and beliefs
through social channels, linkages, sequesters, and quarantines, the
externalities generated by social media come into full focus.
Providing a detailed theory of the creation of social facts, norms,
and falsehoods may give the impression of excess or intellectual
overindulgence. On the other hand, a theory of social behavior, with
respect to media, obviously seems necessary for developing a systemic
approach to the regulation of social media—especially one that avoids
being under-inclusive, but perhaps more importantly, avoids being overinclusive by taking seriously the shaky claim that impostors and
dissemblers can control public opinion and social facts.27 Norm
entrepreneurs require more than just a low-cost platform that can reach
many people. They must make claims that resonate throughout a social
network and trigger sticky patterns of approval, disapproval, pride, and
26

Interesting complications for welfare analysis arise when the democratic input
of a current generation binds a future one. See Frank Fagan & Saul Levmore,
Legislative Sunrises: Transitions, Veiled Commitments, and Carbon Taxes,
FRANK FAGAN & SAUL LEVMORE, THE TIMING OF LAWMAKING 130, 133–37
(2017).
27
Cf. FRANKLIN FOER, WORLD WITHOUT MIND: THE EXISTENTIAL THREAT OF
BIG TECH (2018) (noting that “if we want to be melodramatic about it, we could
say Facebook is constantly tinkering with the quality of news and opinion that it
allows to break through the din, adjusting the quality of political and cultural
discourse”).

401

SYSTEMIC SOCIAL MEDIA REGULATION

[Vol. 16

guilt that burrow deeply into the social experience.

II. SOCIAL NORMS AND SOCIAL MEDIA
A. Attitudes and Compliance in a Vacuum
Compliance behavior is created. Typically, in law, creation is
more or less immediate. Lawmakers produce rules backed by sanctions,
which generate rule-following behavior.28 Otherwise, creation takes time,
and in some cases, so much time, that a proclivity toward compliance
appears endowed or the result of a protracted evolutionary path.29 While
recent advances in theoretical biology acknowledge that we “think fast”,
and that fast thinking occurs independently of slow rational-choice-style
thinking,30 as will become clear, none of this has much to do with deeply
ingrained and morally charged norms like generosity toward migrants and
strangers, stewardship toward the environment, or social attitudes toward
the separation of church and state. People do not think fast about these
issues. For a given set of relations among people, and a given span of time,
the underlying claims and rationales for thinking a particular way either
operate primarily in the socially cognitive foreground, where discourse
and messaging explicitly recognize the role that norm entrepreneurs and
social networks play in shaping group attitudes and beliefs, or they operate
in socially cognitive backgrounds where inconspicuous claims and
rationales can, oftentimes, continue to generate strong compliance and
attitude-shaping effects. Put differently, compliance and beliefs can be
conscious or unconscious, but in either case, they are the fruits of utilityseeking norm entrepreneurs who have leveraged social networks.31

28

For this discussion, it is useful to set aside other purposes for rules, such as
enabling cooperation and coordination through bodies of law like contracts,
corporations, trusts, and estates and to focus exclusively on generating
compliance with commands backed by threats. The distinction between law as a
command and law as a coordination device is elaborated in H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 26 (2d ed. 1961).
29
For instance, Adam Smith notes that:
[M]en are naturally endowed with a desire for the welfare and
preservation of society; but the Author of nature hasn’t left it to men to
use their reason to work out what kinds and levels of punishment are
right for this purpose; rather, he has endowed men with an immediate
and instinctive approval of just precisely the kind and level of
punishment that is most proper to attain it.
ADAM SMITH, A THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS II.i.5.10 (1759).
30
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 19 (2011).
31
Throughout this Article, social networks refer to online and offline groups of
people who are connected through social contact and exhibit some level of
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A social attitude toward immigrants, monuments, single-payer
healthcare, wealth disparity, and other politically charged issues begins, at
some point in time, with a single claim made by a norm entrepreneur.32
This is true for attitudes toward contestable facts as well. The norm
entrepreneur might be a law professor, an acquaintance or parent, a
lawmaker, an evangelist, an industry leader, or an agent for a foreign
power.33 Norm entrepreneurs make validity claims through a medium. For
instance, the law professor may claim that immigration policy should
embrace open borders through a lecture, or a parent may claim that
generosity should be shown only toward friends and family during dinnertable conversation. Likewise, foreign agents may claim that a particular
candidate is corrupt through a Facebook ad. Inasmuch as social media
platforms control the flow of validity claims, they too, function as norm
entrepreneurs.
In each instance, the norm entrepreneur makes a claim that
attempts to persuade the listener of its validity. In a vacuum, the strength
or magnitude of validity is based exclusively on the listener’s existing
beliefs.34 If the student holds weak personal views on immigration and
density greater than zero. For a given context, social media refers to online
social networks (groups of people), the content contained on those networks,
and the platforms which provide the space for the people to connect and share
content.
32
See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, A THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, VOL. 1 8–9
(1981) (theorizing that norm entrepreneurs make “validity claims,” or assertions
that are accepted or not accepted as true by other individual persons and that
claims are ultimately validated or invalidated by a society through a series of
communicative actions). For an early elaboration of this idea, see SMITH, supra
note 29 at I.i.3.2 (noting that to approve or disapprove of another’s opinion is to
adopt or not adopt those opinions).
33
For the proposition that lawmakers create social norms, see Lessig, supra note
5 at 1019; see also Emmanuela Carbonara, et al., Lawmakers as Norm
Entrepreneurs, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 779, 779 (2008) (developing an economic
model of legislative norm entrepreneurship); infra § IB. V. For the proposition
that social media platforms create social norms, see infra § IV.C.
34
Thus, a person’s susceptibility to a claim, at a given moment in time, is based
upon all of the previous claims that she has processed and how those claims
have been refined and shaped by her experiences. Younger people are generally
more impressionable because they have processed less claims. See SMITH, supra
note 29 at I.i.3.10 (noting that people evaluate the communicative acts of others
through comparisons to their own experiences and thinking). Note that this
approach is consistent with contemporary theories of the mind. Materialist
theories that understand all human experience as the result of electrical activity
in the brain, and view all output and thinking as the result of stimulus and input
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believes that the law professor is authoritative and trustworthy, then she
may accept the claim as true. The same claim made by a long-standing
acquaintance may have less (or more) persuasive power. On the other
hand, the authority of the norm entrepreneur may matter little. If the
Surgeon General makes a claim that smoking leads to bad health, but
supports that claim with state-of-the-art scientific evidence, then the
listener may accept that claim as valid despite what she thinks of the
Surgeon General. Similarly, if an accomplished climatologist makes a
claim that global surface temperatures are rising, a voter may reject that
claim despite what she thinks of the climatologist or the scientific
evidence.35 Much like a judge considering the validity of a fact or expert
testimony, a person considering the validity of a claim made by a norm
entrepreneur evaluates its truth based upon its substance and the credibility
of the speaker, and that evaluation itself is set against a backdrop of
existing beliefs of what is true substance and what constitutes a reliable
signal of credibility.36
Once a claim is made, a listener may reject it outright, and the
claim may die immediately. The recipient, for example, may simply reject
(just like a computer), are perfectly compatible with the idea that people process
claims based upon the sum of their previous experiences. See generally,
STANISLAS DEHAENE, CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE BRAIN: DECIPHERING HOW THE
BRAIN CODES OUR THOUGHTS (2014); STEPHEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND
WORKS (1997). This approach also leaves space for theories that presuppose a
preexisting genetic memory or naturally endowed morality; people would
simply process validity claims against the backdrop of their current moralmental state. See PAUL BLOOM, JUST BABIES: THE ORIGINS OF GOOD AND EVIL
218 (2015) (noting that we are born with “empathy and compassion, the
capacity to judge the actions of others, and even some rudimentary
understanding of justice and fairness”).
35
Cf. Cary Funk, How Much Does Science Knowledge Influence People’s Views
of Climate Change and Energy Issues?, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (March 22, 2017),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/03/22/how-much-does-scienceknowledge-influence-peoples-views-on-climate-change-and-energy-issues/
(noting that heightened science knowledge may have no discernible effect on
beliefs that climate change is due to human activity). Receptivity toward
scientific claims are discussed infra at § III.B. 2.
36
Automated content moderation works the same way. An algorithm makes
programmed determinations of the appropriateness of user-posted content such
as photos based upon an existing database of illegal images. See Klonick, supra
note 14, at 1636–37. Human moderators follow internal rules for making
determinations of the appropriateness of content that includes ambiguities. Id. at
1638–39. For instance, a photograph may be classified as nudity or art based
upon existing beliefs of what constitutes art.
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the claim that a presidential candidate is in bad health because it does not
comport with her existing beliefs, and an anonymous norm entrepreneur
making a claim through a dubious Facebook ad does not persuade her
otherwise. Or she may hold no existing beliefs about the candidate at all,
but does not consider any form of political advertisement credible, so that
advertisements in general make no impression upon her. Possible
explanations may be that she currently accepts that most political news is
fake, foreign agents have interfered with social media, or people should
ignore political messaging entirely. All of this leads her to remain immune
to the claim of bad health made by the norm entrepreneur.

B. Attitudes and Compliance in a Network
While existing beliefs may cause a person to reject or accept
claims in a vacuum, where disapproval, approval, guilt, and pride play no
role, the calculus changes entirely once a claim passes through a person’s
social network. Once placed on a network, a validity claim generates
second-party enforcement through social approval or disapproval, which
in turn, generates conscious, voluntary compliance with rules or provokes
the adoption of social attitudes.37 Validity claims, and patterns of approval
and disapproval, can additionally generate sources of guilt and pride. For
now, it is useful to set guilt and pride aside given that second-party social
sanctioning can generate compliance and shape social attitudes entirely on
its own. For instance, a civic leader may claim that strict border control is
wrong because the United States is an immigrant nation, a model of
humanitarianism, that it can lead more strongly through benevolence, and
that the socio-economic benefits from enhanced diversity inure to society
broadly. People who speak out, against immigration, can experience social
approval or disapproval insofar as members of their social network
approve or disapprove of the civic leader’s position. Approval and
disapproval depend upon the systemic composition of one’s social
network. Thus, demonstrated opposition to a claim can carry benefits from
peer-approval and costs from peer-disapproval, and these are determined
by the speaker’s social network.38
37

Thus, internationalization of claims and social sanctioning is not necessary for
generating compliance and the adoption of social attitudes. Insofar as internal
and external sanctioning are aligned, the former amplifies the effects of the
latter. This point is developed in Part III, infra.
38
People attempt to influence the composition of their networks in order to
maximize net approval benefits. See Sinan Aral, et al., Distinguishing InfluenceBased Contagion from Homophily-Driven Diffusion in Dynamic Networks, 106
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 21544, 21544 (2009) (finding evidence that similarities
among people drives more than fifty percent of behavioral contagion in online
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Faced with peer benefits and costs, a person’s utility is plainly
shaped by their choice to oppose or support a claim initiated by the norm
entrepreneur.39 Consider that the entrepreneur, perhaps again citing to an
authoritative study, may claim that organized football is dangerous for
brain health. Under the gaze of friends or outspoken strangers, one may
experience little to no disapproval, and may actually be rewarded with
approval for ignoring the claim and its supporting research.40 Different
configurations of social networks may generate compliance or noncompliance. While the son of a neurologist may have difficulty mustering
the courage to join the high school team, the son of a Heisman Trophy
winner may experience disapproval for willfully avoiding participation.
Presumably the son cares about his father’s approval, but his network is
larger. He must contend with his mother, his classmates, and indeed
everyone with whom he has contact that may approve or disapprove of his
decision. Through feedback, his entire social network bears on his choice
to participate to the extent that he values their net approval. If we divide
his utility into two parts, the first a measure of his enjoyment from playing
football independent of his relationships with others, and the second a
measure of enjoyment from playing strictly derived from his personal
relationships, it is easy to see how his social network can change the
outcome of his choice.
1. Speaking Out: Sexual Harassment in a Network
Similarly, the recent spike in public allegations of sexual
harassment and abuse brought against public figures can be explained, in
part, through the rise of social media platforms. While threats of
retaliation, secret settlements, and other forms of discouragement can
suppress claims, social media encourages them. Socially isolated claims,
as opposed to socially networked claims, carry less probability of success.
In isolation, no discernible pattern of misconduct can emerge. In a
vacuum, perpetrators face no external consequences from others or law,
which increases their capacities for retaliation, and in turn, chills claims.
Even within a social network, retaliation can occur to the extent that the
incident itself is quarantined and its validation relies on the credibility of
the victim. Powerful perpetrators, acting within analog social networks
where approval and disapproval flow more vertically and less horizontally
networks).
39
Note that a norm entrepreneur can change the calculus of actual behavior,
which can lead to real compliance with a rule and not just vocal support of a
contested policy.
40
Lawrence Lessig discusses a similar example with hockey helmets in Lessig,
supra note 5 at 967.
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amongst its members, can marshal social interactions to their advantage.41
Network members who value the approval of perpetrators will refuse to
validate the claim of a victim and may even make efforts to protect or
support the perpetrators.42 When perpetrators cannot resort to vertical
social networks, they can rely on secret settlements that prohibit the victim
from publicizing a claim. Commentators point to the superior bargaining
power of perpetrators and the likelihood that secret agreements consist of
lop-sided terms.43 An additional problem is that secrecy obscures patterns
of misconduct that would otherwise be uncovered had a claim been fully
litigated.44 Because patterns remain hidden, other claimants are unable to
assess the full value of secrecy and properly deter serial harassers.
Given continued fears of retaliation, the endurance of vertical
social networks that reward enablers, and the use of confidential
settlements to silence victims, consider again the question of “why the
wave of claims now?” Sexual harassment has been condemned, especially
in the work place, for at least several decades.45 While lawmakers and
parents have clearly functioned as norm entrepreneurs, the key to
understanding the cascade of claims is the emergence of social media
platforms which have flattened social network membership. Unlike
vertical networks, which enable retaliation and suppression of claims,
41

See Ronan Farrow, From Aggressive Overtures to Sexual Assault: Harvey
Weinstein’s Accusers Tell Their Stories, THE NEW YORKER, (Oct. 23, 2017)
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/from-aggressive-overtures-tosexual-assault-harvey-weinsteins-accusers-tell-their-stories (noting that Harvey
Weinstein orchestrated negative press coverage of his accusers in order to
impugn their credibility).
42
See, e.g., id. (noting how Weinstein would orchestrate meetings with multiple
assistants known as “honeypots” and then dismiss them from the meeting in
order to isolate a victim).
43
See Daniel Hemel, How Nondisclosure Agreements Protect Sexual Predators,
VOX (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/10/9/
16447118/confidentiality-agreement-weinstein-sexual-harassment-nda.
44
See Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan, Semi-Confidential Settlements in Civil,
Criminal, and Sexual Assault Cases, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 311, 311 (2018)
(noting this problem and suggesting that sunshine-in-litigation laws should
mandate semi-confidentiality, or revelation of the facts of a settlement, but not
its terms).
45
See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166 (providing rights to
sue and collect compensatory and punitive damages for workplace sexual
harassment); Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co. 139 F.R.D. 657, 667 (D. Minn.
1991) (certifying a class of alleged sexual assault victims); Oncale v. Sundower
Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (permitting claims against perpetrators of
the same sex).
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horizontal networks diffuse power by multiplying sources of social
sanctioning. These sources, while distributed broadly, provide immediate
feedback that is disconnected from the influence of the perpetrator.
Consider the victim’s choice to publicize an episode of sexual harassment.
She may fear retaliation, but the attendant emotional and financial costs
are more likely to be balanced by social support and the validation of the
truth of her claim. Social media acquaintances reiterate her experience
through redundant messaging, sometimes anonymously, which in each
instance, confers approval benefits and validates her claim. Moreover,
existence of a horizontal network increases the likelihood that she can find
meaningful work beyond the reach of the perpetrator’s influence and can
avoid being blacklisted. Note, too, that the social network which provides
these benefits to her can weaken the vertical influence of the perpetrator.
Enabling assistants and dishonest publicists face greater levels of
disapproval should their support for the harasser become known.46

Figure 1: Passage of Validity Claims through Vertical and Horizontal
Networks

Several decades ago, most victims could only make validity
claims over analog networks, which more often exhibit vertical
membership and are more susceptible to control by the injurer as a result.
46

This is true to the extent that they are members of the horizontal network that
is willing to sanction them. Broad network membership is a necessary condition
for broad social sanctioning.
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With the emergence of social media platforms, victims can pass validity
claims through horizontal networks, which have increased the magnitude
of approval benefits for speaking out and the likelihood that claims are
validated. Reinforcing patterns of approval, enabled by horizontal network
architectures, make it more likely for claims, and the norms that they
embody, to go viral. The normative conclusion is that systemic rules that
support horizontal network architectures are desirable when enforcement
is costly, and in particular, when detection costs are excessive. Even if
more victims are speaking out now because of higher levels of workforce
participation and gender balance, horizontal network structures increase
the likelihood of accruing net benefits from doing so.
2. Online Advertising, Algorithmic News Feeds, and Voter Attitudes
In the same fashion, the voter, who maintains no opinion of a
candidate in isolation, may change her attitude when confronted by a web
of connections, likes, and retweets. Of course the geographic
concentration of voting preferences has long existed prior to social media
platforms, though this might be characterized as an outcome of shared
economic interests vis-à-vis geographic competitors; however, social
media platforms, with their sprawling architectures, can amplify existing
forms of concentration and create new ones, especially along noneconomic dimensions where geographic competition for resources is less
important. For instance, various hashtag campaigns related to social
policies such as parental rights to raise genderless children, elimination of
aggressive policing, and provision of safe spaces for sharing experiences
of sexual violence have had broad geographic appeal (despite
concentrations in urban centers) and have made at least a marginal impact
on state legislatures.47
Where geographic concentration of voter preferences discourages
support for those policies, social media platforms provide approval
benefits across physical distances that can tip support in local referendums
and elections. These effects mirror those experienced with the growing
syndication of television and radio broadcasting in the past.48 However, a
47

See, e.g., Tanya Sichynysky, These 10 Twitter Hashtags Changed the Way We
Talk About Social Issues, THE WASHINGTON POST, (Mar. 21, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/03/21/these-are-the10-most-influential-hashtags-in-honor-of-twittersbirthday/?utm_term=.0da730336fa9 (describing the broad appeal and success of
various hashtag campaigns).
48
See Adam Candeub, Media Ownership Regulation, the First Amendment, and
Democracy’s Future, 41 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1587, 1603 (2008) (noting
that geographic markets are largely delineated by federal and state law through
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key difference is that broadcasting requires significant investment and
involves institutional gatekeeping through shareholder pressures and
governmental licensing.49 As a result, the pool of norm entrepreneurs who
leverage traditional media to make validity claims over networks is
decidedly smaller. While these opinion-makers wield substantial
influence, institutional gatekeeping exerts pressure on the contents of their
messages.50 Thus, the political claims made within analog networks are
restricted and more tightly controlled. With a narrower set of ideas
competing for validity, people place a higher value on the personal
qualities of the norm entrepreneur when validating across claims, leading
to phenomena such as celebrity newscasters. Social sanctioning, as a
result, tends to flow more vertically and less horizontally.
By contrast, norm entrepreneurs who make claims by leveraging
social media make use of horizontal and open network structures. While
this has created space for a greater number of entrepreneurs and can dilute
the strength of messaging, it has simultaneously increased opportunities
for aggregating previously untapped approval benefits and has led to
greater instances of validation of factual and normative claims (including
false ones) which would have been otherwise contained by the
geographical dispersion of social approval benefits.51 But the most
spectrum allocation and cable franchise, and discussing the reduction of crossownership prohibitions and the explicit rejection of a judicial basis of
“viewpoint diversity”).
49
See Peter J. Alexander & Keith Brown, Policy Making and Policy Tradeoffs:
Broadcast Media Regulation in the United States, THE ECONOMIC REGULATION
OF BROADCASTING MARKETS 255, 258–59 (noting that media firms face large,
up-front fixed costs); see also Richard L. Hasen, Cheap Speech and What It Has
Done (To American Democracy), 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 200, 205 (2018)
(noting that barriers to entry into media have dropped and this has amplified
concern for misinformation and propaganda).
50
Apart from accountability exerted by shareholders and licensors, broadcast
communications are highly public and subject to greater levels of scrutiny by the
press, fact-checkers, and political opponents. Social media communications, in
contrast, are often directly aimed at groups segmented on the basis of private
information held by the social media platform. See The Honest Ads Act, § 1989
*5 (2017); see also Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and
Influence Campaigns, Hearing Before Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
115th Cong. 30–41 (2017) (statement of Clint Watts, Robert A. Fox Fellow,
Foreign Policy Research Institute) (comparing broadcast news that is difficult to
manipulate because it requires actual control of the organs of media with social
media news that is easy to manipulate because it requires no control, it is not
curated, and is conducive to rapid proliferation).
51
More precisely, untapped approval benefits were contained by a lower level of
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significant difference for existing law is that a larger pool of norm
entrepreneurs can now leverage social networks, albeit open and
horizontal ones, without being subject to institutional accountability. A
reduction in institutional accountability through the avoidance of
traditional gatekeepers is additive with a reduction in personal
accountability through the ability to remain anonymous.
The Klobuchar, Warner, and McCain proposal essentially
mandates disclosure and unmasks the norm entrepreneur. Facebook and
Google users are accustomed to seeing their newsfeeds and search results
as an organic flow of communications. KWM would alert users to
communications that have been disguised as organic but are actually paid
political advertisements.52 It additionally requires the disclosure of who is
paying for those advertisements. The underlying premise, which mirrors
the existing rationale for regulating offline political advertising, is that
people evaluate the credibility of validity claims based upon substance and
source. The idea that the source matters is the lynchpin of contemporary
ethics in journalism.53 Sourcing enlarges accountability. By doing so, it
guarantees a baseline level of truthfulness in reporting, enhances
democratic discourse, and raises the quality of political candidates. In the
long run, sourcing nurtures robust political institutions. However, these
density of social relationships. To the extent that analog social networks exhibit
a high level of density, they too, generate the effects observed over high-density
digital social networks. Higher levels of density generate higher levels of social
interaction, which lead to marginal increases in social sanctioning and resultant
fact and norm proliferation. See Yoshinobu Zasu, Sanctions By Social Norms
and the Law: Substitutes or Complements?, 36 J. L. STUD. 379, 379 (2007)
(providing a model where increased density and social interaction leads to
higher levels social sanctioning and normative behavior).
52
In addition to disclaimer requirements, KWM mandates the creation of a
public database of online political advertising purchased by advertisers who
spend more than $500 per year and sold by social media platforms with more
than 50 million unique U.S. visitors per month. The Honest Ads Act, § 1989 *6
(2017). The databased must include a copy of the ad, identification of the target
audience, the number of views, the first and last time the ad was displayed, and
the name and contact information of the purchaser. Id. The purpose is to allow
watch-dog organizations to offer near real-time accountability. See Yochai
Benkler, Election Advertising Disclosure: Part 1, HARV. L. REV. BLOG, (Oct.
31, 2017), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/election-advertising-disclosurepart-1/.
53
Society of Professional Journalists, Code of Ethics,
https://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp (noting that journalists should “identify
sources clearly” and “[c]onsider sources’ motives before promising
anonymity”).
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effects assume that people evaluate factual and normative claims on the
basis of careful reasoning. Recent studies in social psychology
demonstrate that people assess claims, especially political ones, more
often as members of a team.54 Instead of forming political attitudes and
beliefs on issues like health care, global warming, and immigration by
deliberating facts, people act more like sports fans. When people are
rooting for the Cowboys or Patriots, they do not engage in rational
deliberation; they are simply expressing loyalty to a team. Paul Bloom
explains that “[t]o complain that someone’s views on global warming
aren’t grounded in facts, then, is to miss the point”55—political views
should be understood “not as articulated conclusions, but rather as ‘Yay,
team!’ and ‘Boo, the other guys!’”56
Inasmuch as political discourse resembles a team sport more than
rational debate, social media platforms cannot manipulate how its users
appraise political facts and norms. Increasing institutional and personal
accountability can do little to change minds. It seems highly unlikely, for
instance, that expectations of a criminal indictment would persuade a
Trump supporter to convert to Team Clinton or vice-versa. To be sure,
social media platforms can engage in hyper-targeting and enable their
advertisers to stoke fears and rouse anger within narrowly segmented
groups.57 But as group membership thins, it becomes increasingly likely
that views cannot be changed. This is a direct result of systemic network
composition and architecture: within a narrow subnetwork, peers are more
likely to confer approval benefits and less likely to confer disapproval
costs.58 Undecided voters, or perhaps independents, are far more likely to
54

See Philip M. Fernbach, et al., Political Extremism Is Supported by an Illusion
of Understanding, 24 PSYCHOL. SCI. 939, 939 (2013).
55
BLOOM, supra note 24 at 236.
56
Id.
57
See, e.g., Kurt Wagner, Facebook’s Reliance on Software Algorithms Keeps
Getting the Company into Trouble, (RECODE, Sept. 14, 2017, 9:44 PM),
https://www.recode.net/2017/9/14/16310512/facebook-mark-zuckerbergalgorithm-ad-targeting-jews (noting that Facebook enabled advertisers to target
users based on racist attitudes).
58
Hyper-targeting of ads and extreme personalization of news generally
increases group polarization and reduces meaningful engagement “across the
aisle” with ideas. See Cass R. Sunstein, Guest Post: Is Social Media Good or
Bad for Democracy?, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM, (Jan. 22, 2018)
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/01/sunstein-democracy/; see also Cass R.
Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization, 10 J. POL. PHIL. 175, 175 (2002).
However, it is unclear whether observations of greater polarization are the result
of disinhibition toward revelation of true preferences in the context of a safe and
approving atmosphere.
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be persuaded by political messaging, but this group is simultaneously far
less likely to be algorithmically identified as a worthy recipient of a
dubious ad. Moreover, undecided voters are more likely to engage in
deliberate reasoning as opposed to political team sports; they consequently
view dubious ads with higher levels of suspicion. Note that ongoing
maintenance of an advertisements database, such as the one envisaged by
the KWM proposal, may reduce instances of hit-and-run political
advertising, but do little towards increasing the quality of political
discourse. Polarized groups will simply debunk or vindicate the archived
advertisements according to their preexisting tastes. On the other hand, if
debunking will reduce a tendency to view untruthful advertisements,
independent of preexisting tastes, then the database may be helpful toward
reducing the impact of inflammatory ads ex post and their creation in the
first place.59 Either way, effective regulation should target the composition
of teams, especially if the social psychology research is correct.
One approach could be to limit the types of groups that may be
algorithmically identified and available for impression. As the target group
widens, the likelihood increases that patterns of approval will be checked
with patterns of disapproval, and that false claims will fizzle out. By
backward induction then, the number of weakened claims will decrease.
This approach has several design advantages. First, it side-steps the
argument sometimes raised by social media platforms that online
advertising is too short to include a full disclaimer.60 Second, it is
impervious to botnets, sockpuppets, and other types of synthetic social
59

This is because content producers would have no incentive to produce ads that
generate no income. See Samanth Subramanian, Inside the Macedonian Fake
News Complex, VOX, (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/velesmacedonia-fake-news/ (noting that the income is derived from impressions).
While the reduction of inflammatory ads may have no impact on persuading
core supporters, it can, over time, increase the overall quality of political
discourse if reduction leads to greater levels of rational deliberation and truthseeking. See Benkler, supra note 52 (noting that an effective database could
keep campaigns more honest and constrained, by allowing internet users “from
professional journalists and nonprofits to concerned citizens with a knack for
data, to see what the campaigns and others are doing, and to be able to report on
these practices in near-real time to offer us, as a society … the ability to
understand who, more generally, is trying to manipulate public opinion and
how”).
60
See Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK, (Sept. 21, 2017),
https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10104052907253171 (promising that
going forward, Facebook will disclose the identity of the advertiser and that it
will provide a link to a page displaying all of the advertisements a particular
advertiser is running to any audience on Facebook).
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behavioral marketing that are more or less resistant to the effects of
disclaimer requirements.
Finally, it avoids chilling speech. Critics of KWM and similar
proposals argue that disclosure regulation flouts First Amendment
principles and will stifle speech.61 By shifting regulatory focus away from
the speaker and toward questionable forms of user segmentation,
regulation of online advertising would track existing rules against racial
and other forms of group profiling. Admittedly, in commercial contexts,
these rules have been primarily applied to economic actors who, among
other things, deny services to members of a protected class.62 A narrowly
tailored systemic prohibition against segmenting users into hate groups
and offering advertisers access to them would likely survive rational
scrutiny. Enhancing the quality of political discourse or minimizing
outside interference in electoral processes are legitimate government
interests; and it is especially difficult to classify the groups, or their
advertisers, as protected classes. In any case, Facebook has already
implemented internal rules against targeting racist groups identified by its
algorithm, though it remains unclear how the rules will be applied over
time. It is important to highlight what, exactly, the rules do: they
essentially subject advertisements that would experience net approval
within a targeted subnetwork to a broader group of people who
disapprove.63 Instead of suppressing platform speakers, they configure
61

See, e.g., Eric Wang, Analysis of Klobuchar-Warner-McCain Internet Ads
Legislation (S. 1989, 115th Cong.), 2017 INST. FREE SPEECH 1 (asserting that
legislation which attempts to limit foreign influence by broadly regulating free
speech will burden online political speech).
62
See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)
(noting that laws which impact ordinary commerce, including freedom of
contract, are unconstitutional unless they rest upon a rational basis; while
economic regulations that “prejudice . . . discrete and insular minorities” require
greater scrutiny when the prejudice “tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities”).
63
Note that this approach targets the demand-side, that is, the consumers of
political advertisements, and can be supported by additional efforts to combat
computational propaganda directed at the supply-side such as: requiring users to
identify themselves to the platform and authenticate their accounts before being
permitted to post publicly anonymous content; limiting the number of posts that
can be made by a single account within a specified time frame; and using human
verification systems like (CAPTCHA) to combat automated messaging. See
Terrorism and Social Media: #Is Big Tech Doing Enough?: Hearing Before
U.S. Sen. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 115 Cong. 3
(2018) (statement of Clint Watts, Robert A. Fox Fellow, Foreign Policy
Research Institute).
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platform architecture more widely to generate a mixed network
composition, which reduces the incentive to produce inflammatory speech
in the first place.
1. Social Media and Campus Speech
Once a norm entrepreneur makes a validity claim that has
persuaded at least one person, that person acts as an enforcer of the
entrepreneur’s opinion or norm to the extent that she publicizes her
approval to others. She can also enforce contrary opinions and norms by
publicizing her disapproval. Oftentimes, enforcement is costly. The
persuaded individual, who is unsure of the reaction that her social approval
or disapproval may generate, will fear a negative response from members
of her social network. She may fear backlash and disapproval for being
preachy or for taking a position that she erroneously believes to be
consistent with her network. Or enforcement may be costly simply for the
time it takes to write an opinionated message to a friend, police a lengthy
Twitter account or Facebook News Feed with likes, or bother with an
apathetic acquaintance or unknown stranger. To be sure, technology has
reduced the economic costs of social enforcement dramatically. No longer
does one need to draft a letter to the editor, appear at the town square for
an evening passeggiata, or travel door-to-door with a petition to publicize
one’s views and change social attitudes. At the same time, a tweet, a like,
or the casual retweet can carry less opprobrium or validation than the
lengthier face-to-face exchanges of yesteryear, though not always.
Today’s social networks are large, provide immediate feedback, and can
appear downright sincere when its participants broadcast intimate personal
details.64 These features, among others, generate meaningful second-party
enforcement that shape social attitudes and social norm compliance. As
the sanctioning strength of a social network increases, taking a position on
behalf of a norm entrepreneur becomes costlier, not just in terms of time
64

See Anna M. Lomanowska & Matthieu J. Guitton, Online Intimacy and WellBeing in the Digital Age, 4 INTERNET INTERVENTIONS 138, 139 (2017) (noting
that online interactions can mirror levels of intimacy of offline interactions, and
that in some contexts, “can actually accelerate intimacy formation in
comparison”). Consider that pop-stars Erykah Badu and Jay Electronica tweeted
4595 “protected” followers, that is, only those Twitter users who have chosen to
follow them (as opposed to any Twitter user), live descriptions of the delivery of
their baby. See Jayson Rodriguez, Erykah Badu, Jay Electronica Blog Child’s
Birth in Real Time on Twitter, MTV NEWS, (Feb. 2, 2009),
http://www.mtv.com/news/1604057/erykah-badu-jay-electronica-blog-childsbirth-in-real-time-on-twitter/. As Lomanowska and Guitton emphasize, sharing
intimate personal experiences such as childbirth increases the sincerity of online
interactions. See Lomanowska & Guitton, supra note 64 at 139.
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and effort, but also for the negative response it may produce. Policing a
validity claim may elicit a net positive response as well. Networked
acquaintances who approve of supporting or opposing a claim provide
increased utility and satisfaction to the enforcer.65 Inasmuch as the benefit
from receiving aligned social responses exceeds the costs of eliciting them,
people will continue to engage in second-party enforcement.
Seeking positive responses and avoiding negative ones leads a
person to choose like-minded acquaintances and generally select a
network composition that reflects her personal beliefs. Note that this
network-selection behavior is entirely rational and helps explain why
social networks systemically exhibit high levels of herding and
polarization, and why they tend to aggressively reinforce existing patterns
of belief. In addition to network selection, contemporary platform
architecture dramatically limits the disapproval costs that users face.
Social media platforms steer users toward upvotes and likes (and away
from downvotes and dislikes), and obscure information about being
unfriended or blocked by another.66
Historically, universities have fostered political speech partly for
the values and ideas that flourish there, but also because there exists a
density of social interactions amongst students who share those values and
ideas. Students who protest for or against providing a platform to a visiting
speaker incur few costs and receive nearly certain benefits from their
respective social networks.
While university speech regulations
concerning time, manner, and place limit speech activity so as to minimize
conflict among the university body and interference with university
responsibilities,67 this policy implies that threat of disruptive protest is
65

See SMITH, supra note 29 at II.iii.2.1 (noting that the love of praise and the
dread of blame motivates action).
66
For instance, Facebook users can only unlike comments, photos, or posts that
they have previously liked. See How Do I Unlike Something?, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/226926007324633?helpref=uf_permalink (last
visited Mar. 30, 2018). Because of the time and complication associated with
discovering who has unfriended or blocked them on Instagram, Facebook, and
Twitter, interested users typically resort to third-party apps. See Joe McGauley,
How to See All the Jerks Who Unfriended You on Facebook, THRILLLIST, (Dec.
23, 2016, 2:46 PM), https://www.thrillist.com/tech/nation/how-to-see-whounfollowed-you-tracking-friends-on-instagram-facebook-and-twitter.
67
See, e.g., Berkeley Campus Regulations Implementing University Policies,
Section 300, Regulations Concerning Time, Place, and Manner of Public
Expression, BERKELEY – UNIV. OF CA, http://sa.berkeley.edu/uga/regs., (last
updated Aug. 23, 2011) (stating that its regulations concerning time, place, and
manner of public expression are designed to prevent interference with the
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increasingly successful the more likely it disrupts campus life. Moreover,
disruption provides increasingly large social approval benefits to its
members as a social network increases in size and narrows in viewpoint.68
Simultaneously, counter-protestors who organize for continuance of the
speech experience inverse benefits and costs. Given the zero-sum nature
of campus conflict, net social benefits are a function of the size of the two
opposed groups, and efficiency—at least in the short run—generally
favors the preference of the larger group.69
To the extent that protest generates conflict, the students
externalize a number of costs that are incurred by the university. The most
prominent are monitoring and security costs. Ideally, these would tend
toward zero, which explains why norm entrepreneurs and lawmakers
invest in norms that establish procedural excellence and promote rational
deliberation within fora.70 On the other hand, there has been a turn in social
attitudes amongst student bodies, which is reinforced by heightened social
network density through the use of social media, that sound university
procedure must prevent the circulation of hateful substance.71 Insofar as
this approach generates lasting social benefits, it may be efficient over
time. Even so, if taken to its logical limits, universities can no longer
exclusively rely upon time, manner, and place restrictions for making
determinations of permissible speech. Given a university policy to prohibit
disruptive speech, such restrictions will only continue to have bite on
campuses inasmuch as the students themselves embrace the speech as
substantively valid and refrain from disruption.72 Again, it bears emphasis
university’s conduct and affairs).
68
Disapproval costs from taking a contrary view increase in addition.
69
Group size may matter little for long-run efficiency if the views of the
majority lead to a residual social benefit or cost
70
Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 599–600 (5th ed.
1998) (noting that the economic goals of civil and criminal procedure are to
minimize errors of judgment and the costs of administering law). For an early
modern historical account of the limitations of discursive excellence toward
solving social problems, see TERESA M. BEJAN, MERE CIVILITY: DISAGREEMENT
AND THE LIMITS OF TOLERATION passim (2017).
71
See ERWIN CHERMERINSKY & HOWARD GILLMAN, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS
13 (2017) (noting that in contemporary campus speech issues, “it is the students
who demand that the campus take action against speech they find offensive”).
72
To remain consistent with the First Amendment, schools must be careful to
base their decisions to prohibit speech on disruption of student learning and
school environments and not on the offensive character of speech contents. See
Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011), (ruling a
MySpace chat group which encouraged vulgar and offensive comments about
another student not protected because the distress it inflicted caused school
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that granting de facto adjudicatory power to the students may be socially
efficient in the short run if a majority disfavors the speech. In the long run,
efficiency requires that disruption lead to a lasting social benefit.73
One clear area for university action is to curb norm entrepreneur
activity that provides few social benefits to students and accomplishes few
long-run social goals, and is instead aimed at increasing monitoring and
security costs incurred by the university and degrading procedural norms.
When unfriendly outsiders organize a protest, and perhaps a counterprotest at the same time, their agitation efforts are unambiguously meant
to drive up institutional costs and reduce the quality of discourse. As
recently seen in Texas, foreign agents were able to organize two-sided
protests through Facebook advertising for $200.74 If we loosely delineate
disruption), cert denied, 565 U.S. 1173 (2012); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue
Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 928 (3d Cir. 2011), (finding a phony
MySpace profile created by student to ridicule school principal protected under
the First Amendment because the spoof profile did not substantially disrupt
student learning and school environment), cert denied, 565 U.S. 1156 (2012);
Padgett v. Auburn Univ., Case No. 3:17-CV-231-WKW (M.D. Ala. 2017)
(protecting speech because university prohibition was unlawfully based upon its
offensive content); see also Erwin Chermerinsky, Hate Speech is Protected Free
Speech, Even on College Campuses, VOX (Dec. 26, 2017),
https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/10/25/16524832/campus-free-speechfirst-amendment-protest (referencing the Padgett case and noting that the
Supreme Court has consistently held that public institutions, including
universities, cannot prohibit speech on the basis that it is deeply offensive); see
also Robert C. Post, There Is No 1st Amendment Right to Speak On a College
Campus, VOX (Dec. 31, 2017), https://www.vox.com/the-bigidea/2017/10/25/16526442/first-amendment-college-campuses-milo-spencerprotests (noting that “[t]he limits on the university’s ability to regulate the
speech of its students are . . . demarcated by the limits of its educational reach
over students”).
73
An analysis would track basic First Amendment policy where the chilling of
speech is weighed against the probabilistic outcome that the speech creates an
even greater social loss. See United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir.
1950) (J. Learned Hand) (explaining that courts must in each case “ask whether
the gravity of the ‘evil’, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion
of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger”), aff’d, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
See also infra § IV.A.
74
Though this example did not occur on a campus, it is instructive. See Natasha
Bertrand, Russia Organized Two Sides of a Texas Protest and Encouraged ‘Both
Sides to Battle in the Streets’, BUSINESS INSIDER, (Nov. 1, 2017, 1:25 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/russia-trolls-senate-intelligence-committeehearing-2017-11 (reporting Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Burr
estimating costs of agitation at $200).
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two social networks, one for the protestors, and one for the counterprotestors, each member’s welfare is obviously enhanced by increased
approval benefits and avoidance of disapproval costs by participating.
Protest participants receive nearly certain social approval benefits within
their respective social networks, but these tend to be outweighed by
externalized security costs and manufactured institutional decay. Only if
the two networks were systemically unified would there be opportunities
for simultaneous approval and disapproval, which would, in turn, reduce
the likelihood of the occurrence of the costly protest and counter-protest.
This means that university policies which foster the creation of plural
network membership reduce susceptibility to institutional attack. For
instance, political advertising could be confined to a campus-wide
Facebook or Kialo page.75 By restricting political advertising to a broadly
viewed page, the university can drive convergence of approval and
disapproval within a singular platform location to the extent that its student
body is relatively balanced with multiple views.76 Guaranteeing that the
advertisements are targeted broadly to the entire university body may be
costly but perhaps not prohibitive. Of course to the extent that Facebook
and other platforms prohibit advertisers from targeting hate groups as
suggested in Section II.B.2, the probability of agitation within isolated
social media platform locations, and the consequent increases in
monitoring and security costs incurred by campuses, decrease.

III. SOCIAL NORMS AND THE SELF
A. The Emergence of Guilt and Pride
Because social networks provide approval and disapproval
benefits and costs, they can change attitudes, calibrate beliefs, and make
compliance with newly created norms (or old ones) go viral. In addition,
they can generate compliance with legal rules. Rules that are rarely
enforced by law, because of problems with detection or because the costs
of bringing a claim are greater than the relief sought, can be enforced with

75

For an overview of Kialo, a social media platform that splits arguments into
binary “for” and “against” trees to enable apprehension of opposing views and
encourages users to rank arguments on the basis of their reasoned qualities, see
Jonathan Margolis, Meet the Startup that Wants to Sell You Civilized Debate,
FIN. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/4c19005c-ff5f-11e79e12-af73e8db3c71.
76
Efforts toward curbing external costs might be additionally supported through
the creation of content aimed at reducing hate speech through programs like
“Creators of Change”. See Creators of Change, YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/yt/creators-for-change/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2018).
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social sanctions.77 The non-recycler who routinely ignores local
regulations may begin to recycle when confronted by neighbors; or the
parent may attempt to control a troublesome child more in public than at
home. And to the extent that a would-be serial harasser is a member of a
robust network that disapproves, he too, is more likely refrain from asocial
misconduct. None of this is surprising or novel, but it lays the foundation
for what happens next, when sanctions of approval and disapproval
enforced by others transform into sanctions of personal guilt and pride
enforced deliberately by one’s self.
Carrying out social sanctioning can be costly for the enforcer.
While social media platforms have dramatically reduced the necessary
time and effort, enforcers can, nonetheless, experience meaningful costs
when their sanctioning backfires and generates negative reactions
throughout their network even though these are limited by platform
architecture. 78 Enforcers sanction then, when the expected value of
sanctioning is positive. They weigh the benefits, which are composed of
some measure of how deeply they care about the propagation of a social
attitude or norm, and the expected net approval benefits that accrue to them
when they disseminate it. Because net approval benefits are reduced by
any backlash disapproval that the enforcer thinks could be forthcoming
from her network, second-party social sanctioning tends to peter out.
When people come into contact with a validity claim that they
accept as true, they can develop sources of internal sanctioning that are
strictly independent of other people’s beliefs.79 For instance, a person who
accepts the claim that the Earth is warming due to human activity can feel
internal pride from accurately recycling. She may carefully sort the plastic
from the paper not because she is under the watchful gaze of a stranger or
friends, but because she internally reflects upon her beliefs and
experiences emotional benefits from taking a consistent action. Once she
posts a selfie, seated beside two piles of plastic and paper, she is
positioning herself to receive probabilistic approval benefits from her
network. If she is running late, and simply disposes of the recycling
unsorted, she experiences internal guilt. A friend who catches her in the
act, and posts a photo on Instagram, may generate disapproval costs
inasmuch as her network disapproves. Two points are of interest. First, her
77

See Cooter, supra note 22 at 1597 (noting that intimate relationships are a
primary influence on a person’s character); Zasu, supra note 51 at 379 (noting
that informal sanctions can substitute for law).
78
See supra note 66.
79
See SMITH, supra note 29 at Part I.iii.1 (noting that systems of internal
approbation and self-love are based on reason and sentiment).
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internal guilt or pride for accurately recycling is the result of earlier work
completed by a norm entrepreneur. Second, once a claim is internalized,
internal sanctioning is not probabilistic because it does not depend upon
the actions of others. While approval and disapproval may or may not be
forthcoming given prevailing attitudes and the composition of her
network, her internal guilt and pride is certain.80 This point matters. It
means that enforcers of validity claims can reliably economize on costs.
Even when facts and norms are widely accepted and sanctioning
is unlikely to trigger backlash, enforcement still requires time and effort.
More importantly, enforcement of broadly accepted norms within a
network can generate disapproval because it can signal that the norm has
not been fully internalized by the speaker. For instance, explicitly
disapproving of a norm against holding out religious beliefs in a
commercial setting on a particular message board might actually signal
that the enforcer considers doing so an option.81 Other complexities related
to the sincerity of the sanction, such as the enforcer’s timing and context,
may generate disapproval as well. Sounding insincere, preachy, or out of
touch, carries a cost. Thus, even though expected backlash may approach
zero as the fact or norm becomes more widely held, there is always a nonzero probability of disapproval. For this reason, levels of second-party
social sanctioning fade, not so much for changing tastes or the reduced
salience of a once important issue, but rather for the emergence of lowercost enforcement via guilt and pride. Recycling still matters, but enforcers
can rely on sources of internal guilt and pride and simultaneously avoid
appearances of insincerity, arrogance, or ignorance.
It should be clear that the deterioration of approval and
disapproval may not occur for every social attitude and norm. When
internalization of a claim is slow or non-existent over a network, then
social enforcement will generate net benefits for enforcers who care
deeply about a fact or norm (so long as expected costs are sufficiently
low). In those cases, patterns of approval and disapproval will subsist, but
it bears emphasis, that in other cases, it makes economic sense for patterns
80

This is true so long as the norm prevails internally within the individual. If a
norm entrepreneur makes a new validity claim, which unseats the underlying
fact or norm that is driving an individual’s pride and guilt, then the previous
norm no longer prevails and guilt and pride sanctioning will lapse. However, it
is incorrect to say that a fixed and prevailing norm that has been internalized
generates expected values of guilt and pride. So long as the norm is internalized,
guilt and pride are certain by definition.
81
Cf. SETH STEPHENS-DAVIDOWITZ, EVERYBODY LIES 11–12 (2018)
(highlighting the complications of uncovering true preferences on the basis of
search results).
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to dissolve. At dissolution, the underlying norm remains supported by
internal sanctioning and continues to exert compliance and attitudinal
effects.

B. The Emergence of Unconscious Compliance
As facts and norms become more deeply internalized, rational
individuals can maximize their return from holding beliefs and complying
with norms by forgetting that they once required first-party enforcement
to conform. A person who gives up smoking may feel a sense of pride
from declining a cigarette within the first few years of quitting, when the
chemical and psychological urges are still strong. But a former smoker
who declines a cigarette a decade later experiences less pride if any at all.
Economists would say that the marginal benefits of pride decline over
time.82 Moreover, engaging in pride (or guilt) to generate compliance or
conformity with a social attitude may itself be costly inasmuch as it recalls
an earlier calculus that tolerated non-conformity as an option. A former
smoker who declines a cigarette while pregnant for instance, may
experience guilt for recalling that she once considered smoking while
pregnant an option, and may avoid rewarding herself with pride. This is
not to say that all norms and attitudes eventually become unhinged from
first-party enforcement. The point is simply that sometimes, forgetting that
one was guilty or prideful can be a rational decision aimed at maximizing
the benefits of internalization.83 Over time, this form of psychological
evolution can, in some instances, generate involuntary and unconscious
compliance with normative behaviors (and apparent acts of self-sacrifice),
which generate no meaningful benefits for the actor.

Figure 2: How Social Norms Go Viral84
82

See BECKER, supra note 21 at 50.
Id.; see also Gary S. Becker, Habits, Addictions, and Traditions, 45 KLYKLOS
327, 327 (1992).
84
Approval, disapproval, guilt, and pride are denoted A, D, G, and P.
83
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It is important to keep in mind, however, that unconscious
behavior and attitudes can be set in motion by rational maximizing norm
entrepreneurs. Consistent with their financial and social goals, norm
entrepreneurs invest in validity claims to the extent that they expect a
positive return on their claim-making investments.85 This instrumental
account of norm creation and evolution can be used to help explain a
number of phenomena, including differences in attitudes toward
immigration, climate change, and church-state separation. Before turning
to these examples, it is useful to sketch a basic three-part taxonomy. It may
be said that shallow norms operate on the surface of social networks. They
subsist primarily on the basis of approval and disapproval and tend to
decay at a relatively high rate. As a result, they generate lower returns.
Deep norms rely jointly on external approval and disapproval as well as
internal pride and guilt. Because these norms have socially matured, they
often decay at lower rates and generate higher returns to the norm
entrepreneur. Unconscious norms operate on the basis of rational
forgetfulness and are rarely conscientiously challenged. They decay at the
highest rate, and require the highest level of investment to dislodge.
1. Immigration
Social attitudes toward immigration are shaped by norm
entrepreneurs and second-party enforcers. There are a number of
instrumental reasons why entrepreneurs and enforcers may want to shape
societal views toward immigration. They may believe that diverse
societies hold the greatest prospect for lasting peace and human progress;
they could be concerned with international competitiveness in the face of
declining population growth within their nation; perhaps they may
represent a narrow set of interests that prefer higher or lower levels of
competition for jobs amongst workers—both skilled and unskilled; or they
may have internalized a generosity norm in the past and, as a result, benefit
from professing compassion to strangers. In all likelihood, a desire to
express an attitude toward immigration is based upon some combination
of reasons, these and others, and has been developed with great nuance.
Given the salience of validity claims made in relation to
immigration in contemporary political discourse and communication,
norms and attitudes are clearly operating at the shallow or deep level. To
the extent that each person in a society feels guilt or pride for holding pro85

For social media platforms, returns include profit, corporate image, long-term
viability, good citizenship, and a friendly regulatory environment. See infra §
IV.C.
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or anti-immigration beliefs, the attitude can be said to be operating at a
deep level. Norm entrepreneurs who seek to dislodge and replace that
attitude must invest in claims tailored toward generating guilt and pride
throughout a social system. For instance, pro-immigration messaging can
be anchored in common-cause: The United States is an immigrant nation,
its people are immigrants, and individuals who disapprove of immigration
today have reason to feel guilty since their forebears relied, in part, on proimmigration attitudes to drive policy. These types of claims are more
difficult to make in non-immigrant nations. For example, in Japan, antiimmigration attitudes can be traced to one of its earliest recorded poems,
which celebrated an “eightfold fence” that separated it from other lands
and peoples.86 To the extent that norm entrepreneurs seek to shape
prevailing attitudes toward immigration within Japanese society, they
have to appeal to a broader cosmopolitan history that exists outside of
Japan. Claims may go viral on the surface of a Japanese social network,
on the basis of peer approval and disapproval, but do little toward changing
deeply held attitudes and beliefs. In this case, greater levels of investment
in claims are required for generating change.
When the President uses profane language to describe a particular
set of countries and expresses disdain for their immigrants,87 it does little
to change existing attitudes toward immigration policy to the extent that
American attitudes and norms operate on the surface, and are primarily
shaped by second-party social sanctioning anchored in peer-approval and
disapproval. In this setting, reactions to inflammatory statements that
target the speaker and generate patterns of social sanctioning around
immigration are based more upon a person’s alignment with the speaker
and less upon the policy contents of the message. Contemporary rational
deliberation, with its characteristic dryness and dearth of provocative
rhetoric, is a relatively weak player in the world of political team sports.
On the other hand, internalization, at least of political attitudes and beliefs,
requires greater levels of personal reflection for which basic social media
platforms seem poorly equipped to systemically generate.88
86

The poem is found in the imperial anthology, Kojiki, dated to the early eighth
century. 古事記 (KOJIKI) [RECORDS OF ANCIENT MATTERS], 396–402 (trans.
Basil Hall Chamberlain, 2d ed., 1932) (c. 712).
87
See Julie H. Davis, et al., Trump Alarms Lawmakers With Disparaging Words
for Haiti and Africa, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/01/11/us/politics/trump-shithole-countries.html.
88
This may be because they engender terse, normative messages that contain
less content, analysis, and factual support. On the other hand, shorter messages
may be easier to process. See LARRY SAMUELSON, EVOLUTIONARY GAMES AND
EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 24 (1998) (noting that apprehension increases with
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It may be that prevailing American social attitudes toward
immigration are primarily based upon social approval and disapproval
amongst acquaintances and have little to do with internal values. For
instance, a voter may feel little pride (or guilt) for supporting (or opposing)
an altruistic policy that increases immigration levels from conflict- and
disaster-stricken countries or countries with low average incomes. Any
guilt, if present, may be outweighed by one’s identity with a chosen
political team. In this case, a viral norm will quickly decay throughout a
social network.
Recall that social media platforms generally increase the density
of social interactions.89 What does this mean for immigration? If
immigration attitudes are primarily based upon internal values, and social
media messaging tends to target external patterns of group approval and
disapproval, then immigration discourse will remain relatively
unperturbed. Norm entrepreneurs must make claims that target internal
guilt and pride, and these types of claims are less likely to travel through
media such as casual tweets, comments, and upvotes. Only if deep claims
aimed at internalization take root, will guilt and pride increase, and will
social norms and attitudes become more consistent over time.
1. Climate Change
This point can be clearly seen in current disagreements over why
Americans view climate change with more skepticism than Europeans.
Cass Sunstein has suggested that political support for combating terrorism
is greater than support for climate change because the former is more
salient.90 People can see the effects of terrorism and imagine themselves
harmed. They cannot do the same for climate change. Public attitude
surveys seem to support this claim. Latin America and Africa, two regions
that have experienced relatively high levels of drought, are more
concerned with climate change than other regions.91 Likewise, Australia,
which experiences regular forest fires, maintains strong support for public
“sufficiently simple” messaging that commands attention).
89
See supra note 51.
90
Cass R. Sunstein, The Availability Heuristic, Intuitive Cost-Benefit Analysis,
and Climate Change, 77 CLIMATE CHANGE 195, 195 (2006).
91
Bruce Stokes, Richard Wike, & Jill Carle, Global Concern About Climate
Change, Broad Support for Limiting Emissions, PEW RESEARCH CTR: GLOBAL
ATTITUDES & TRENDS, (Nov. 5, 2015),
http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/11/05/global-concern-about-climate-changebroad-support-for-limiting-emissions/ (finding 74% and 61% of survey
respondents in Latin America and Africa very concerned, and only 54% and
45% of European and American respondents very concerned).
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action.92 Salience cannot fully explain the difference in attitudes between
the United States and Europe, however. Both regions are situated in the
Northern Hemisphere and have been insulated from dramatic and visible
climatic changes, but differences in concern between its citizens vary
substantially.93
Studies often explain these differences in terms of scientific
literacy.94 Europeans are more knowledgeable in science, the argument
goes, and are consequently more concerned with global warming.95 Some
believe that more concern translates into greater levels of second-party
enforcement. For instance, a common view is that “there is a fair bit of
social pressure to behave in an environmentally responsible manner in
places like Sweden.”96 In order to change American attitudes toward
climate change then, norm entrepreneurs must invest in claims that
increase scientific literacy. On the other hand, more recent studies
emphasize the role of political affiliation and ideology, and build on
92

The Climate Institute, Climate of the Nation 2016: Australian Attitudes on
Climate Change,
http://www.climateinstitute.org.au/verve/_resources/COTN_2016_Executive_Su
mmary.pdf (finding that 77% of Australians believe climate change is occurring
and continues to grow and that a majority believes the government should do
something about it).
93
See Stokes et al., supra note 91.
94
Anthony Leiserowitz, et al., Climate Change in the American Mind, Yale
Program on Climate Change Communication and George Mason University
Center for Climate Change Communication 9–10 (2017) (finding that only 13%
of Americans understand that there is a scientific consensus that humans cause
global warming); van der Linden et al., The Scientific Consensus on Climate
Change as a Gateway Belief: Experimental Evidence, 10 PLOS ONE 1, 7 (2015)
(finding that beliefs about scientific consensus shape attitudes toward
combatting climate change); cf. Elke C. Weber & Paul C. Stern, Public
Understanding of Climate Change in the United States, 66 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
315, 315 (2011) (noting the difficulty in understanding climate change results in
polarization of beliefs).
95
Jing Shi, Knowledge as a Driver of Public Perceptions About Climate Change
Reassessed, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 759, 759 (2016) (noting survey
evidence of greater scientific literacy, and greater concern for climate change, in
Europe versus the United States). But see, Dan Kahan et al., The Polarizing
Impact of Science Literacy and Numeracy on Perceived Climate Change Risks,
2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 732, 723 (2015) (noting that scientific literacy
tends to polarize views because people with high literacy use it to retain and
justify preexisting beliefs).
96
Elisabeth Rosenthal, What Makes Europe Greener than the U.S.?¸ YALE ENV.
360 (Sept. 28, 2009),
http://e360.yale.edu/features/what_makes_europe_greener_than_the_us.
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psychological research that views politics as a team sport.97 The tension
within this research should be clear insofar as increasing scientific literacy
generally reduces politicization. Literacy engenders rational deliberation,
which decreases the tendency for norms to operate exclusively on the
surface of social networks via approval and disapproval. If social
psychologists are correct, policy should be directed toward depoliticizing
climate change issues, with care being paid to not inflame beliefs grounded
in ideology.98
It would seem that this can be accomplished at least two ways:
increasing scientific literacy and decreasing politicized validity claims
made over social networks. What remains unclear, however, is whether
first- and second-party enforcement crowd each other out. In other words,
will limiting instances of “Yay skeptics, and boo scientists” (and viceversa) free up space for rational thought and the emergence of guilt and
pride? If so, then policy directed toward reducing casual social media
communications related to climate change may, counterintuitively,
encourage the development of deep social norms inasmuch as platform
messaging fails to generate internal reflection and simply reinforces
existing polarized ideologies with patterns of peer approval.
One systemic approach is to encourage norm entrepreneurs and
social network members to make and enforce validity claims related to
climate change on platforms or sub-platforms that are dedicated to townhall-style discourse or scientific debate. In other words, modify the
platform architecture for claims that are meant to target internalization.
This approach, taken by Reddit, StackExchange and others, has led to a
relatively higher quality of idea exchange and has decreased instances of
ideological herding and trolling.99 The platform permits others to reward
97

See, e.g., Kelly S. Fielding & Matthew J. Hornsey, A Social Identity Analysis
of Climate Change and Environmental Attitudes and Behaviors: Insights and
Opportunities, 7 FRONT. PSCYH. 121, 121 (2016) (noting that tensions between
political conservatives and progressives drive differences in attitudes toward
climate change).
98
In other work, I have noted that lawmakers should work toward depoliticizing
climate science and other gridlocked policies by enacting contingent rules that
become effective only if certain scientific facts obtain. See Frank Fagan, Legal
Cycles and Stabilization Rules, THE TIMING OF LAWMAKING 11, 16–18 (Frank
Fagan & Saul Levmore eds. 2017); Frank Fagan, Political Paralysis and Timing
Rules, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 43, 48–50 (2016).
99
See, e.g., How Does StackExchange Stimulate Honest, Open Discourse While
Limiting the Effects of Trolling?, META STACKEXCHANGE,
https://meta.stackexchange.com/questions/289629/how-does-stack-exchangestimulate-honest-open-discourse-while-limiting-the-effe (last visited Apr. 6,

427

SYSTEMIC SOCIAL MEDIA REGULATION

[Vol. 16

the poster for exceptional participation—not so much for the content that
they provide, but for the manner in which they provide it. Yet another
systemic approach is to provide links to related content which articulates
counter-arguments or places similar arguments within different
contexts.100 By creating an atmosphere that encourages rational
deliberation, climate change discourse can be funneled toward social
media platform locations that foster the development of deep norms.
2. Religious Expression (and Wedding Cake)
As a norm moves deeper toward unconscious cognitive process,
either because its roots are rationally forgotten or simply lost over time,
the rationale for following its mandate becomes increasingly difficult to
ascertain. Older rationales may evolve and merge with newer ones, be
entirely replaced, or become confused, incoherent, or unspoken. Chaotic
evolutions are often on display when two opposing norms conflict.
Consider that in most Western societies today, there exists a deep norm of
free expression of private religious beliefs. The norm is at least as old as
the Reformation, if not older, and has been codified in many statutes and
constitutions across Europe and the United States.101 Within many
countries, especially Protestant ones, free expression was eventually
interpreted as the freedom to choose one’s own religious practices. In
order to preserve free choice for everyone, it was necessary that one’s
personal practices did not apply to others. This led free religious
expression to engender a norm of separation between church and state.102
Religious freedom is rarely understood as a normative precursor for
2018).
100
For example, Facebook is testing the integration of its “Related Articles”
program into Facebook News Feed. See Sara Su, New Test With Related Article,
FACEBOOK (Apr. 25, 2017), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/04/news-feedfyi-new-test-with-related-articles/. Similarly, Apps like Read Across the Aisle
nudge users toward articles that are less consistent with their political beliefs.
See Richard Bilton, A News App Aims to Burst Filter Bubbles by Nudging
Readers Toward a More “Balanced” Media Diet, NEIMANLAB (Mar. 9, 2017),
http://www.niemanlab.org/2017/03/a-news-app-aims-to-burst-filter-bubbles-bynudging-readers-toward-a-more-balanced-media-diet/. See also note 75 for a
description of Kialo, another platform that encourages evaluation of argument
and counter-argument.
101
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. 1; FRENCH DECLARATION OF HUMAN AND
CIVIC RIGHTS, Art. 10–11 (1789).
102
See BRAD S. GREGORY, REBEL IN THE RANKS 218, 255–56 (2017) (noting
that separation of church and state “continues to be paradoxically enabled by the
freedom of religion, which itself was conceived as a solution to problems
inherited from the Reformation era”).
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church-state separation because it presents a partial paradox: if separation
leads to secularization of public life, then freedom of expression is
truncated to the extent that expression takes place in public. The
incoherence will eventually subside when the older religious expression
norm is forgotten, discarded, or reconfigured.
The Masterpiece Cakeshop case can be understood as a step
toward reconfiguration, or at least an emphasis and reaffirmation of the
importance that religious expression is free insomuch as it does not impact
others in public life.103 Assuming that the creation of the cake is an
expression of the baker’s religious beliefs, the benefit that he receives (his
dignity interest) is dependent upon denying the couple service.104 When
denied service, the couple incurs a cost (equivalent to their dignity
interest). On the other hand, when compelled to create the cake, the couple
receives their dignity interest, but the baker is denied his. The case might
be easily decided if the magnitude of the parties’ dignity were observable
and law were content to ignore the interests of society at large.105 Without
an ability to measure the parties’ subjective valuations of dignity, law
might consider a proxy in the form of the income the baker gives up by
denying the couple a cake, and perhaps the economic value of a free cake
offered to the couple by another supportive baker. Neither seems
satisfactory. Both parties have given up something of value, and their
sacrifices serve only to further complicate an already challenging
evaluation of their dignity interests. It seems reasonable then, and
necessary for maximizing social welfare, to consider the dignity interests

103

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Col. Civil Rights Comm’n, Docket No. 16111 (U.S. argued Dec. 5, 2017).
104
That the creation of the cake is a form of the baker’s religious expression is a
key assumption on which the case could turn. The forgoing discussion considers
the consequences of its validity. If the court finds otherwise, it might be useful
to imagine a case where a couple asks a religious painter to symbolically paint
their union, or some other factual scenario where creative expression contrary to
religious belief must be compelled.
105
See Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Segal, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based
Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2579 (2015)
(asserting that law directs lawmakers to consider “the harms to other citizens
that accommodating complicity-based conscience claims may inflict”). For an
argument that cases are rarely decided strictly on the costs and benefits to the
parties, and instead involve an assessment of the costs and benefits to society at
large, see Frank Fagan, Renovating the Efficiency of Common Law Hypothesis,
THE TIMING OF LAWMAKING 280 (Frank Fagan & Saul Levmore eds. 2017)
(developing a model where judges decide cases on the basis of allocative
efficiency amongst parties and non-parties).
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of non-parties or other societal norms and values.
In the Piggie Park Enterprises case, where the defendant pled
denying service as a form of religious expression, the Supreme Court
expressly invoked the advancement of the interests of non-parties in its
decision to award attorney fees to the plaintiff.106 Undoubtedly, the court
based its decision on the text and purpose of civil rights legislation, but in
doing so, it implicitly elevated a church-state separation norm above the
norm of religious expression. The endorsement of public accommodation
laws, when situated in similar conflicts, can also be understood as an
affirmation of the predominance of a church-state separation norm. To the
extent that this norm remains ascendant, it should be expected that
religious expression will be removed from social interactions where
dignity interests between parties are subjective, and where broader societal
interests are implicated. Once the norm of free expression is reshaped, its
conflict with civil rights will peter out, and it will begin its descent toward
unconscious cognitive process unless it is called to conflict again by a
norm entrepreneur.
Attitudes toward immigration, climate change, and religious
expression subsist almost entirely on internalized values. Validity claims
that only fuel interpersonal sanctioning operate on the surface of political
team sports and make less of an impact on the shaping of preferences and
the construction of deeply held beliefs. Regulating social media content to
reduce those types of claims will do little to enhance social welfare.
Aggregate levels of approval benefits and disapproval costs will remain
relatively unchanged since the teams are engaged in zero-sum conflict. On
the other hand, configuring network architecture with systemic social
media regulation so that claims are funneled toward locations where
discursive excellence thrives, can lead to greater levels of internalization.
Consider that Reddit, in an effort to elevate the quality of its fora,
“shadowbans” users who come to troll.107 Traditional banning blocks the
troll from the forum, but trolls can simply change their names and continue
to troll. By contrast, shadowbanning blocks others from viewing the troll’s
messages: the troll continues to troll, sees her messages, and believes she
is still trolling. But she is speaking to an empty hall, even as she believes
106

Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (“If
successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorneys’ fees, few
aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance the public interest by
invoking the injunctive powers of the federal courts.”).
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See Can Someone Please Explain to Me What “Shadow Banning” Is?,
REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/AskReddit/comments/11ggji/
can_someone_please_explain_to_me_what_shadow/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2018).
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the seats are full. Policing content rarely fosters rational deliberation and
the internalization of facts and norms. By focusing on platform
architecture, a tendency toward group polarization can be neutralized, and
users can be nudged with systemic measures toward network locations
where rational deliberation proliferates.

IV. THE REGULATION OF SOCIAL MEDIA
A. People and the First Amendment
The validity claims of people, lawmakers, and social media
platforms are governed by different sets of rules even though their claims
evolve and devolve in identical and predictable patterns. People, as norm
entrepreneurs, make validity claims and engage in social enforcement.
Claims, and enforcement of other people’s claims, are speech acts
governed by the First Amendment. Various types of speech—religious,
political, commercial, obscene, and so on—receive various degrees of
scrutiny, but all can be profitably analyzed with the general framework
formulated by Learned Hand and later updated by Posner.108 The essential
idea is that law should compare the costs of forbidding speech with the
costs of permitting it and choose the lesser of the two evils. By
categorizing speech, law uses archetypes to identify the magnitude of costs
in order to reach a decision. Forbidding religious or political speech, for
instance, carries a greater cost than forbidding obscene speech.
Conversely, permitting religious or political speech typically carries a
lesser cost than permitting obscene speech. Religious and political speech
can generate positive externalities by normalizing prosocial behavior and
discourse; obscene speech can generate negative externalities by
normalizing asocial behavior. The consideration of externalities
introduces uncertainty: when speech is permitted, law cannot be sure that
it will be socially costly. It must guess. Learned Hand’s formula, therefore,
directs law to forbid speech only if the costs of forbidding it are greater
than the probabilistic costs of permitting it.109
Posner expands this idea by noting that the social costs of
permitting speech may occur later in time.110 Not only should social costs
be discounted by their probability of occurrence, but they should
additionally be discounted by the time that they take to arrive. If Martin
Luther were governed by the First Amendment, he surely would have been
permitted to post the Ninety-Five Theses. Not only did they constitute
108

See US v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 201 (5th Cir. 1950); Richard A. Posner,
Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 2, 2 (1986).
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See Posner, supra note 108 at 8.
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high-value religious and political speech, but their disruptive effect (if
considered a social cost) was hardly certain and took time.111 With respect
to the reconfiguration of religious expression set in motion by the Theses,
any social cost would have certainly approached zero, given the length of
time needed for its development. In general, speech acts that lead to the
development of deep norms must be so heavily discounted for time and
uncertainty that First Amendment law would counsel against their
prohibition. People, as norm entrepreneurs engaged in shaping the future,
are given free reign. This makes intuitive sense. Any decision in favor of
defendants in Masterpiece Cakeshop will surely include a heavilyweighted rationale of the immediate social impact of permitting the baker
to deny the couple service. This type of reasoning, while not strictly
utilitarian, is expected from the “ideological” justices. What is interesting,
is that the swing vote belongs to the justice who tends to engage in loose
statements about time and tradition.112 When considering probabilistic
costs and benefits that occur later in time, a decision is simply more
difficult and, unsurprisingly, swings.
Any assessment of First Amendment constraints would be
incomplete without consideration of the costs of forbidding speech. These
costs, which include the cost of suppressing valuable information plus any
legal error generated from suppressing too little or too much, must be
weighed against the social costs of permitting the information to be
circulated. Returning to Luther, the costs of forbidding his post of the
Ninety-Five Theses might have forestalled the development of a norm of
religious expression and its evolution toward church-state separation.
These costs, too, were sufficiently uncertain and would take many years
111

See id.; see also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (permitting
advocacy of unlawful conduct unless speaker intends to incite specific unlawful
action that is likely to result imminently). Gregory notes that Luther initially
called for an official council to reconcile differences and that his early goals
were aimed at mild reforms within the confines of existing law and Roman
Catholic authority. See GREGORY, supra note 102 at 57–58.
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For example, in Romer v. Evans, in reference to a Colorado law that fenced
sexual minorities out of political processes, Justice Kennedy noted that: “It is
not within our tradition to enact laws of this sort.” 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).
Comparing the approaches of Kennedy and Posner toward striking down
prohibitions of gay marriage, Martha Nussbaum notes: “Posner’s tone is
skeptical, caustic, intolerant of cant; Kennedy’s is solemn and lofty. Posner
addresses concrete issues of welfare; Kennedy adduces high ethical abstractions,
dignity and equality. Posner is punctilious in matters of argument, Kennedy
loose and impressionistic.” Martha C. Nussbaum, Janus-Faced Law: A
Philosophical Debate in FRANK FAGAN & SAUL LEVMORE, THE TIMING OF
LAWMAKING 270 (2017).

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

432

to incur. Quite obviously, Catholic authorities sought to suppress
Protestant speech on the basis of its immediate effects, while reformers
received protection from political leaders who benefitted immediately
from agitation.113

B. Lawmakers and Politics
Lawmakers, as norm entrepreneurs, face an entirely different set
of constraints to their capacity for making claims and enforcing the claims
of others. Because claims and social sanctions are expressed in statutes,
regulations, and judgments, lawmaker norm entrepreneurship is primarily
demarcated by political feasibility. For some time, legal scholarship
generally ignored the expressive power of law, which might be attributed
to a comfortableness with its democratic pedigree: lawmakers, especially
legislators, are accountable to the electorate. Besides, law’s expressive
power, when compared to law’s immediate compliance-generating power,
seems far less important: any expressive power can easily be shortcircuited with new, countervailing rules.114 The expressive function then,
supports the underlying purpose of a rule by transmitting additional
information beyond the rule itself. Because lawmaking involves
opportunity costs, that is, lawmakers must choose to spend time and
political capital on one rule versus another, grant certiorari, or develop
particular regulations at the expense of others, lawmaking inherently
conveys information about societal priorities. In addition, the public and
participatory nature of lawmaking strengthens the salience of its object.
Laws that are difficult to enforce because detection is costly express values
which encourage victims to speak out; and laws that address social wrongs
that affect a small number of people suggest a need for heightened public
attention. In other cases, law might focalize a method for social
coordination. But whatever the form it takes, legal expression is
circumscribed by lawmakers’ ability to pronounce law.
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See GREGORY, supra note 102 at 53–54 (noting that the protection of
reformers was used as leverage in negotiations with Catholic authorities).
114
Of course legal scholars did not entirely ignore the expressive function of
law, but earlier articulations were more clearly formulated by sociologists. For
instance, in his History of Sexuality, Foucault stated:
I do not mean to say that the fades into the background or that the
institutions of justice tend to disappear, but rather law operates more and
more as a norm, and that the judicial institution is increasingly
incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative,
and so on) whose functions are for the most part regulatory.
FOUCAULT, supra note 20 at 144.

433

SYSTEMIC SOCIAL MEDIA REGULATION

[Vol. 16

C. Social Media Platforms and Regulation
The most apparent difference amongst people, lawmakers, and
social media platforms is that people and lawmakers directly create
content. Platforms are more like plumbers. They adjust their algorithms to
control the flow of what their users see. By controlling the flow, social
media platforms determine which validity claims are made over their
networks and can exert meaningful control over patterns of approval,
disapproval, pride, and guilt. For instance, Google Analytics closely
tracked which issues its users fact-checked during the Obama-Romney
presidential debates.115 By tracking “who was searching what” during the
debate, Google was able to deliver highly segmented advertising
impressions of its users who had demonstrated, by means of their search
histories, an elevated interest in a particular issue.116 This is a clear
example of a platform indirectly determining the contents of claims. Once
these advertisements and other forms of claim-making are linked to
engagement and amplification platforms such as Facebook and Twitter,
users initiate patterns of social sanctioning. These patterns, too—of
necessity—are controlled by the platforms. Social media users face
opportunity costs of viewing and enforcing claims. They can only act on a
limited number of messages. For this reason, social media platforms must
limit and curate the messages that their users see. News stories,
accompanying comments, and other forms of content are categorized and
triaged. A user who checks the first few items of a news feed or Twitter
account routinely ignores the items buried toward the bottom. Choice
architecture and nudging are the natural outcomes of tailoring essentially
limitless media to individual user profiles and characteristics.
The selection and prioritization of social media items, though
algorithmically obscured, can be understood as motivated by profit and
other managerial interests, which can sometimes present conflicts internal
115

Google Analytics, Case Study, Obama for America Uses Google Analytics to
Democratize Rapid, Data-Driven Decision Making (2013)
https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/www.google.com/en//intl/hr_ALL/a
nalytics/customers/pdfs/obama-2012.pdf.
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To the extent that Google Analytics was unable to identify which user was
searching a particular issue, say, because a user was searching anonymously,
then Google might be able to identify which issues were important to users from
a particular geographic location by analyzing IP addresses. As noted in the case
study, tailoring and directing messages on the basis of geography was critical for
victory: “The results from Election Day speak for themselves: a resounding
victory, with nearly every battleground state falling into the President’s column.
[Data analytics has been credited] for providing much of the winning margin.”
Id.
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to the social media platform itself. These internal conflicts among
managerial interests stand in contrast to the gubernatorial interests of the
state.117 To the extent that platforms engage in content moderation and
censorship, they exercise quasi-judicial governance functions that can, in
some cases, satisfy state preferences; however, this satisfaction is the
outcome of alignment between platform and state interests.
For instance, when YouTube considers the removal of a terrorist
recruitment video, it is considering a First Amendment question and
exercising quasi-judicial power. It is obvious that managerial and
gubernatorial interests can overlap. YouTube’s profitability, corporate
image, long-term viability, and capacity to avoid regulation depend on
satisfactory operation of its quasi-judicial function. If YouTube fails to
remove the video, its corporate image may decline, its users may go
elsewhere, and the state may impose costly regulations. Inasmuch as
managerial and gubernatorial interests strongly converge, there exists a
good case for self-regulation.118 Where they diverge, rules are desirable so
long as their benefits exceed their costs.
This point is clearly seen in recent German legislation aimed at
enforcing, on social media platforms used within Germany, speech content
restrictions that were set in place there following the Second World
War.119 Embedded in Germany’s federal criminal code are prohibitions
against the “use of symbols of unconstitutional organizations” unless for
“art or science, research or teaching;” speech that incites treason or other
crimes; threats to commit various crimes; incitement to hatred, including
through the dissemination of written materials; depictions of violence; and
defamation of religions or religious and ideological organizations.120
Most social media platforms are globally sprawled and vast. Their
117

See Balkin, supra note 13 at 1153 (2018) (noting that platforms engage in
content moderation, which amounts to private governance); Klonick, supra note
13 at 1662 (referring to private content platforms as systems of governance).
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If platforms are unable or otherwise lack competence to carry out their
overlapping interests, then their interests can be understood as insufficiently
strong or weakly overlapping.
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Bundestag, An Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks
(July 12, 2017) https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzgebungsverfahren/
Dokumente/NetzDG_engl.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2. For the original
version, see Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz, 61 BUNDESGAZETZBLATT 3352–55
(2017) http://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?startbk=
Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&jumpTo=bgbl117s3352.pdf.
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German Criminal Code § 86, 91, 111 100a, 111, 126, 130, 131, 140, 166,
184b.
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managerial interests often fail to sufficiently overlap with localized
gubernatorial interests such as Germany’s.121 Facing insufficient
convergence, Germany cannot expect platforms to self-regulate in its
interest. Moreover, Germany’s benefit from the regulation is large because
it enhances enforcement of an easily identifiable and constitutionally
settled content restriction. Perhaps more importantly, the benefit is
delivered with little cost to the state inasmuch as it relies on private citizens
for its enforcement. Platforms with more than two million users in
Germany must provide the public with “an easily accessible process” for
registering complaints of illegal content directly with the platform.122 For
content that is “manifestly unlawful” the rule requires the platform to
block access within twenty-four hours. For content that is simply
“unlawful”, the platform must block access within seven days unless “the
unlawfulness of the content is dependent on the falsity of a factual
allegation or is clearly dependent on other factual circumstances” or the
platform “refers the decision regarding unlawfulness to a [lawfully]
recognized self-regulation institution . . . and agrees to accept the decision
of that institution.”123 If a platform receives more than 100 complaints per
year, it must comply with various reporting requirements.124 Users and
members of the public who remain unsatisfied with the outcome of the
complaint procedure, either because the platform is unresponsive, or they
disagree with its decision, may file an online complaint with the German
Department of Justice.125 Without sufficiently strong convergence of
managerial and gubernatorial interests, Germany chose to develop a rule
that leverages average internet users for its enforcement and limits the
general reporting requirements of platforms to aggregate and serious
problems.
Note that this rule loosely tracks the Restatement approach to
communication tort liability of distributors. Only if a platform is alerted of
unlawful content and refuses to block it, can a user proceed to the German
Department of Justice with the complaint.126 By providing for notice-based
121
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liability, the rule avoids the complications presented by later decisions
such as Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., which held
distributors liable if they relied on automated editorial control.127 Where it
parts ways with American law, and in particular § 230 of the
Communications Decency Act,128 is that it prioritizes the gubernatorial
interests of the state in content restrictions over the managerial interests of
the platform such as content proliferation or cost minimization of
aggressive enforcement.
On the other hand, scholars and courts have recognized that the
immunity provision of § 230 encourages platforms to be good citizens, and
remove offensive material, because they will not be held liable as editors
if they do; and § 230 promotes free speech and e-commerce because
platform immunity nurtures platform growth.129 While some scholars have
suggested that recognition of cyber civil rights should circumvent
immunity, the regulatory benefit from speech suppression is clearer in
Germany because specific content restrictions are codified.130 In the
United States, regulatory benefits must be developed by constitutional
interpretation. Moreover, benefits can be interpreted to move in the
opposite direction because the absence of regulation prioritizes a
constitutionally guaranteed right of free speech. Only if the normative
conflict is settled, will the gubernatorial interests of the state become
clear.131 For now, the state can avoid settling the conflict by allowing
liability to distributors if they know or should have known of the defamation).
127
1995 WL 323710 *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (finding distributor liable as a
publisher because it sought “to gain the benefits of editorial control” through
automated content filtering and user guidelines for posting and that it “uniquely
arrogated to itself the role of determining what is proper for its members to post
and read on its bulletin boards.”).
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On cyber civil rights, see Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U.
L. REV. 61 (2009). Other rationales suggesting that the benefits of regulation are
large include: cyberspace amplifies speech harms, especially sexual harassment;
the anonymity of cyberspace has caused hate speech to go mainstream; and
online harassment, bullying, and revenge pornography have proliferated. See
Klonick, supra note 13 at *1614.
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Act ought, more than any other, to produce universal alarm; because it is
levelled against that right of freely examining public characters and
measures, and of free communication among the people thereon, which

437

SYSTEMIC SOCIAL MEDIA REGULATION

[Vol. 16

platforms to privately balance free speech values with other social goals
such as robust security and the discouragement of hate speech. If the
platforms do too much and thus infringe upon First Amendment principles,
or too little and consequently degrade security and civil rights, the state
can intervene. Where platform action converges with state preferences, a
self-regulation model should prevail. It should be clear that platforms have
some room to maneuver, so long as the gubernatorial interests of the state
remain weakly defined. The state has room to maneuver inasmuch as it
systemically regulates social media and avoids directly combatting speech
acts.
The short- and medium-term profitability of platforms generally
increases with their size and the presence of an unfettered legal
environment. If users are unhappy with unmoderated content, they may go
elsewhere. If the state is unhappy, it may impose rules. Indeed, much like
lawmakers, platforms are accountable to the demands of their users and to
broader political feasibility. Platforms accordingly intensify selfregulation up to the point where its marginal benefit equals its marginal
cost. Setting an optimal content moderation policy maximizes the volume
of content by balancing aggregate user engagement and alienation while
avoiding costly state interference. Generally, if judges or legislators
shoehorn social media platforms into paradigmatic company towns,
television broadcasters, newspaper editors, municipal utilities, or
governance institutions, it will likely be the result of a means-end
instrumentalism for subsuming divergent managerial interests within
broader societal concerns.132
As norm entrepreneurs, large platforms like Facebook, YouTube, and
has ever been justly deemed the only effectual guardian of every other
right.
James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 1800) Writings 6:385401, http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/
amendI_speechs24.html.
132
Company towns are functionally equivalent to state actors and must
guarantee First Amendment rights. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502–
03 (1945). Because radio and television broadcasters monopolize frequency
spectrums, there exists a public right to suitable access and regulators are
justified in requiring broadcasters to present both sides of public issues. See Red
Lion Broad Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). Newspaper editors receive
protection to decide the contents of their newspapers. See Miami Herald Pub.
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). On platforms as utilities, see Packingham
v. North Carolina 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) (holding that preventing users from
accessing social media platforms is a denial of a First Amendment right opening
the door to treat platforms as quasi-utilities).
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Twitter can develop longer-term projects delimited by prevailing social
norms and political possibility. A freedom to pursue long-term managerial
interests through norm entrepreneurship is consistent with First
Amendment principles because an outcome must be deeply discounted by
the uncertainty of its success and the time it takes to achieve it. Any
justification for the limitation of platform construction of deep norms must
be met with new law or creative lawyering. From a social welfare
perspective, pursuit of deep norms remains unproblematic. Creating them,
and eliciting habitual compliance, relies on the free choice of people to
engage in internalization. In a world where the formation of political
attitudes and beliefs are more like team sports, platforms cannot shape
electoral outcomes insomuch as social facts and falsehoods matter little.
On the other hand, platforms direct the flow of political messaging and can
nudge users toward network locations where higher-quality political
discourse is the norm.133 If nudging decreases polarization costs, it may be
worthwhile. While First Amendment doctrine circumscribes direct speech
restrictions, the systemic regulation of platform architecture is more likely
to survive constitutional scrutiny. In any case, platforms appear to be
leading the way here in terms of developing creative architectures and
implementing them, though one could imagine sustained divergence and
the need for state action in the future.134

CONCLUSION
Social facts, norms, and falsehoods proliferate because of the actions
of people and the architecture of platforms. Inasmuch as regulation is
desirable, law should focus on systemic adjustment and reconfiguration of
platform architecture and avoid targeting and suppressing speech contents.
Rules that shape the contours of the forum, and the manner in which
speech acts proliferate, can nudge speakers toward social media platform
locations where discursive excellence thrives. Whether social media can
be analogized to public utilities, company towns, broadcasters, newspaper
editors, or governance institutions—and regulated accordingly—is
important only to the extent that one of these models adequately aligns the
managerial interests of the platform with the gubernatorial interests of the
state. To the extent that these interests are already aligned, a self-regulation
133

See supra note 99–100 and accompanying text.
It should be clear that this Article focuses on content moderation and speech
restrictions and sets aside for future work questions of private law. Inasmuch as
platforms are violating end-user agreements or failing to take efficient
precaution to safeguard user data, private contract and tort law claims may be
enough to force platforms to internalize the external costs that these violations
and breaches create. If not, then a case may be made for intervention.
134

439

SYSTEMIC SOCIAL MEDIA REGULATION

[Vol. 16

model should prevail. Where they diverge, a case can be made for
intervention.

